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TAXATION-INCOME T AX-AcCRU.ABILITY OF DEALER RESERVES ,v1THHELD
BY FINANCE COMPANY-Petitioner, a dealer in new and used trailers, had
agreements with several finance companies whereby they agreed to buy
promissory notes he received on installment sales. The agreements permitted the finance company to withhold a portion of the unpaid balance
on each note and credit such amount to the petitioner's "dealer reserve"
account. The petitioner was liable for all notes in default and the finance
company could charge the reserve with any unpaid balance. The reserve
could also be charged with any debts of the petitioner to the company.
Periodically, the dealer was to receive portions of the reserve in excess
of a certain percent of the total balance outstanding. The ultimate
balance in the reserve was to be paid to the petitioner whenever all indebtedness for which it was security had been discharged. Reporting his
income for 1949 and 1950, petitioner, an accrual basis taxpayer, did not
include as taxable income the amounts credited to the reserves. The
Commissioner included such amounts in his income and the Tax Court
affirmed.1 On appeal, held, reversed. At no time during the taxable
years in question was any excess in the reserves payable to the petitioner.
Therefore, his right to receive the sums in the reserve funds was contingent and not accruable as income. Johnson v. Commissioner, (4th
Cir. 1956) 233 F. (2d) 952.
An accrual taxpayer is required to declare a fund as income when the
right to receive it becomes fixed. 2 An obligation subject to a substantial
contingency is not accruable.3 In the principal case, the Tax Court
felt its decision was governed by Shoemaker-Nash, Inc. 4 and ruled that
petitioner's right to receive the reserved amount became fixed at the time the
notes were sold to the finance companies, there being no reason to believe
that collection was improbable. This is the first case involving reserves
withheld by finance companies from a trailer or automobile dealer to
reach a United States -court of appeals. In reversing the Tax Court, the
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit relied upon an earlier Third

Johnson v. Commissioner, 25 T.C. 123 (1955).
Spring City Foundry Co. v. Commissioner, 292 U.S. 182 (1934).
3 Cassatt v. Commissioner, (3d Cir. 1943) 137 F. (2d) 745, affg. 47 B.T.A. 400 (1942);
Fairmont Creamery Corp. v. Helvering, (D.C. Cir. 1937) 89 F. (2d) 810; Jenkins-Wright
Co., P-H T.C. Mem. Dec. 1f42,035 (1942).
4 41 B.T.A. 417 (1940), which has been followed in a line of cases involving au tomobile dealer reserves. Colorado Motor Car Co., P-H B.T.A. Mem. Dec. 1f40,178 (1940);
Royal Motors, Inc., P-H T.C. Mem. Dec. 1f45,255 (1945); Town Motors, Inc., P-H T.C.
Mem. Dec.1f46,173 (1946); Ray Woods Used Cars, Inc., P-H T.C. Mem. Dec. 1f52,290 (1952),
l
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Circuit holding on similar facts, 5 which decision in tum was based upon
the single case involving auto dealer reserves6 in which the Tax Court
reached a de~ion contrary to the Shoemaker case. Inasmuch as the
finance companies in the principal case were entitled to charge uncollectible losses against the reserve, the Court concluded that the right to
receive payments was sufficiently contingent and uncertain
to render
it non-accruable. No recognized test exists by which to determine whether
a right to receive is sufficiently contingent to prevent accrual.7 It is
quite clear, however, that an accrual taxpayer receiving payment by
means of a promissory note which appears to be colle~tible cannot refuse
to accrue the amount of the obligation merely because it might not be
collectible when due.8 This is a normal business risk which should not
justify postponement of accrual.9 The petitioner's right to receive payments out of the reserve fund was also contingent in the sense that the
reserve could be charged with any matured obligation owing to the
finance company. Such charges against the reserve account would result
in the petitioner receiving less cash from the reserves, although he would
receiye the full benefit of the reserve credit through a reduction in his
obligations.10 The Third Circuit holding which the court in the principal
case relied on attempted to distinguish Shoemaker by the fact that in the
latter case there was no express agreement that the reserves could be diminished by charges for delinquent and unpaid notes, for absent that provision a reserve account merely affects the time of payment and not the right
to receive it. The Shoemaker agreement did provide, however, that the
dealer was required to purchase repossessed cars from the finance company
at a price equal to the unpaid balance of the note, and the reserve fund

as

5 Keasbey and Mattison Co. v. United States, (3d Cir. 1944) 141 F. (2d) 163, where
notes of purchasers of asbestos products were sold to finance companies which credited
a portion of the consideration to a reserve fund to liquidate possible losses from uncollectible notes.
6 Beaudry, P-H B.T.A. Mem. Dec. 1f41,ll4 (1941), wherein the court distinguishes
the Shoemaker case on the grounds that here the dealer did not have the right to
receive, either periodically or ultimately, any portion of the reserve less than a certain
percentage of the total notes outstanding. On the other hand, in the Shoemaker case
(as in the principal case), the dealer had the right to receive the ultimate balance in the
reserve. This difference would seem to justify the Board of Tax Appeals in rejecting
the Shoemaker case as controlling.
7 For a discussion of accruability of obligations subject to contingencies, see Holland,
"Accrual Problems in Tax Accounting," 48 MICH. L. R.Ev. 149 (1949). An accountant
analyzes dealer reserves in 26 RoCKY MT. L. R.Ev. 78 (1953), and suggests a test for determining accruability which is factually and theoretically unsound.
s Automobile Ins. Co. v. Commissioner, (2d Cir. 1934) 72 F. (2d) 265; Spring City
Foundry Co. v. Commissioner, note 1 supra. See also K. Taylor Distilling Co., 42 B.T.A.
7 (1940).
9 See Elmer v. Commissioner, (2d Cir. 1933) 65 F. (2d) 568; Alworth-Washbum Co.
v. Helvering, (D.C. Cir. 1933) 67 F. (2d) 694.
10 The possibility that an obligation due from another may be used to satisfy a
liability to that person that arises in the future should have no effect upon the accruability of the obligation at the time it is first established. See Luther Burham, 33 B.T.A.
IIOO (1936), affd. (8th Cir. 1937) 89 F. (2d) 725.
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was to serve as security for just such obligations. Thus the two agreements, though dissimilar in language, make the reserve funds equally contingent.11 In the principal case petitioner's practice of taking a specific
bad debt charge-off each time an item was charged to the reserve by the
finance company was also shown. The Tax Court ruled that this was
inconsistent with the existence of the dealer reserve, since the reserve in
effect constituted a bad debt reserve for the petitioner. The court of
appeals dismissed this phase of the case, however, on the ground that
during the taxable years in question petitioner had not taken a specific
bad debt charge-off of any item which had also been charged against his
reserve. The principal case is subject to objections on both theoretical
and practical grounds. If mere uncertainty of payment, inherent in every
debtor-creditor relationship, is to be considered sufficient reason for not
accruing an obligation, then the whole theory of accrual accounting in
regard to commercial transactions is undermined.12 As a practical matter
the taxpayer escapes the policing power which the government exercises in determining whether the reserve for bad debts is reasonable or
not.1 3 The taxpayer also secures the benefit of two inconsistent practices
by adopting the specific bad debt charge-off method while maintaining a dealer reserve. Even where there has been no double deduction
for the same bad debt, there is, nevertheless, a distortion of the taxpayer's
income through a bunching of specific bad debt charge-offs and dealer
reserves in the same year.14 Finally, the taxpayer is permitted to adopt
what is in effect a tax avoidance scheme. If purchasers' notes are held
by the dealer, the entire face value of the notes is accruable, but by selling the notes to finance companies, that portion which is credited to the
dealer's reserve is rendered non-accruable. This writer believes that the
recent refusal15 of the Tax Court to follow the principal casel6 is justified
in law and policy.
A. Duncan Whitaker, S. Ed.
11 In cases before the Tax Court subsequent to the Keasbey case, note 5 supra,
reserves were held to be accruable income even though there was an express agreement
that losses due to delinquency could be charged against the reserves. Town Motors, Inc.,
note 4 supra; Ray Woods Used Cars, Inc., note 4 supra.
12 See Taylor Distilling Co., 42 B.T.A. 7 (1940).
13 I.R.C., §166 (c). If the dealer reserve is excluded from gross income there is no
basis for applying statutory restrictions applicable only to deductions from gross income.
14 By changing the terms of the agreements with respect to the dealer reserves, the
taxpayer can in effect freely shift back and forth between the specific bad debt charge-off
method and the reserve method.
15 Albert M. Brodsky, 27 T.C. No. 23 (1956), which involved similar dealer reserves.
1G The Commissioner has assessed similar deficiencies against the petitioner for the
years 1951-1954. Non-acquiescence in the principal case was reasonably to be expected.

